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Recent advances in spatial and temporal networks have enabled researchers to more-accurately
describe many real-world systems such as urban transport networks. In this paper, we study the
response of real-world spatio-temporal networks to random error and systematic attack, taking a
unified view of their spatial and temporal performance. We propose a model of spatio-temporal
paths in time-varying spatially embedded networks which captures the property that, as in many
real-world systems, interaction between nodes is non-instantaneous and governed by the space in
which they are embedded. Through numerical experiments on three real-world urban transport
systems, we study the effect of node failure on a network’s topological, temporal, and spatial
structure. We also demonstrate the broader applicability of this framework to three other classes
of network. To identify weaknesses specific to the behaviour of a spatio-temporal system, we
introduce centrality measures that evaluate the importance of a node as a structural bridge and
its role in supporting spatio-temporally efficient flows through the network. This exposes the
complex nature of fragility in a spatio-temporal system, showing that there is a variety of failure
modes when a network is subject to systematic attacks.
1. Introduction
Network science provides many powerful methods to study a great variety of systems in society,
nature, and technology. Modelling complex systems in terms of their network structure allows
researchers to understand, predict, and optimise their real-world behaviour [48,49]. Detailed data
describing the interactions and relationships in real-world systems have become increasingly
available, emerging from domains as diverse as transport [24], biology [11,15], infrastructure [57,
74], and sociology [21]. The ability of network analysis to capture relationships and dependencies
between components makes it an essential tool for studying system resilience [3,14,16,18,32].
It is known that local disruptions can have a significant impact on the global behaviour of a
system [2,3]. The study of a network’s vulnerabilities and its response to malfunction helps
engineers design robust systems [2,8,9,13,17,57] and scientists understand complex phenomena
such as neurodysfunction [23,59], economic and financial risk [29,64], and disease spreading [56].
Methods for robustness analysis generally assume that the system is represented by a network
composed of static links, focusing on the topological properties of a network subject to disruption.
Depending on the system and research question, a static representation may also incorporate
weighted and directed edges, allowing richer dynamics to be modelled. In many systems,
however, edges are not continuously active [33] and the quantities their weights represent may
vary with time. Furthermore, these time-varying systems may also be spatially embedded, and
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2thus the ability for nodes to interact is governed by the space in which they operate as well as
their network connectivity.
Urban transport systems have a long history in network analysis [5,18,19,25,44,54], and are
an exemplar of a system that is temporal [33], spatial [7], and multilayer [39]. Examples of recent
studies of transport systems that account for time-varying and multilayer properties, either jointly
or separately, can be found in Refs. [18,25,53,54]. Furthermore, the resilience of such systems is
of particular interest, with insights from static network analysis enabling better-engineering of,
for example, rail and metro systems [19,20]. Aside from transport systems, there are many classes
of network that are spatial, temporal, or both. Engineering spatial network resilience in fixed
communication networks has particularly received attention over recent years, including new
methods for identifying critical geographic regions [46,47,65] and understanding spatial damage
to fibre optic networks [1]. Communication networks and cellular nervous systems are just few
examples of systems that can be represented by means of networks embedded in space and time.
Relying only on a static space-agnostic aggregation of such networks over-simplifies the rich and
complex relationships in the real systems they represent.
The consequences of ignoring the temporal and spatial constraints on networks have been
highlighted in recent surveys of spatial [7], temporal [33], and multilayer [10,39] networks.
Advances in temporal networks have provided researchers with a valuable framework that can
be used to understand the temporal structure of systems, and empirical measurements have
demonstrated that static representations often over-estimate the true connectivity of real-world
temporal systems [37,40,41,67]. Furthermore, while static methods investigate purely topological
measures of system vulnerability, such as giant component size and network diameter, new
methods allow researchers to additionally explore temporal efficiency [55] and expose differences
in the temporal function of the network when subject to random error versus systematic
attack [60,67].
However, temporal network models sometimes make the strong assumption that interactions
are instantaneous. For many types of spatially embedded system, this assumption ignores the
influence that space has in constraining the structure of the network. As an example, transit
between stations in a public transport system naturally incurs a time delay while a passenger
travels, and the specific delay depends on the speed of the service currently operating and
distance between stations. In one of the earliest works on temporal networks, Kempe et al. [38]
propose a schedule-based analysis of transport systems as a potential application of temporal
network analysis; more-recent application of time-respecting paths [30,38] to transport networks
can be found in Pan and Saramäki [53], and Gallotti and Barthelemy [25]. Critical nodes in such
a system are those that not only bridge two clusters in the network, but also act as a conduit for
rapid flow between physically distant areas of the system.
To study robustness in spatially embedded temporal systems we apply a general framework
that is able to capture instantaneous and non-instantaneous types of interaction. We formulate
a model of spatio-temporal systems in which the interactions and relationships between
components are constrained by the space and time in which they are embedded (Sec. 2). The
analysis of a network’s spatio-temporal structure (defined in Sec. 2) provides the foundation to
measure its topological, temporal, and spatial function. These measures are presented in Sec. 3,
along with systematic attack strategies designed to expose different weaknesses in the network.
In order to validate our framework and show its utility and flexibility, in this paper we explore
the behaviour and resilience of six empirical examples of spatio-temporal systems (described
in Sec. 4); specifically, three urban transit systems, a national air travel network, a biological
neural network, and a mobile phone communication network. Our empirical analysis in Sec. 5
highlights a crucial distinction when examining the robustness of spatio-temporal systems: we
must consider the impact of disruption to a network’s temporal and spatial efficiency, in addition
to its topological structure. Furthermore, critical nodes play different roles in terms of their
topological, temporal, and spatial utility, and therefore systematic attack strategies can differ in
the damage they cause to the network.
3Table 1. Summary of notation used in this paper.
Symbol Description
τ Window width
G[t] Graph for snapshot at time t
S[t] Matrix of physical propagation speeds between nodes for snapshot at time t
D[t] Matrix of physical distances between nodes for snapshot at time t
K[t] Reachability set (dependent on implicit origin node v0 and start time t1)
P[t] Progress matrix (dependent on implicit origin node v0 and start time t1)
λ Temporal efficiency
ς Spatial efficiency
S Size of largest strongly connected component as fraction of all nodes
Rλ(f) Temporal robustness at deactivation rate f
Rς(f) Spatial robustness at deactivation rate f
2. Connectivity in spatio-temporal networks
We start by introducing the notation and framework with which we define connectivity in a
spatio-temporal network. Our model follows a fundamental property of spatial networks: the
space in which the system is embedded acts as a constraint on the structure of the network [7].
In a spatio-temporal setting, we can represent this constraint as the speed with which one node
can interact with another. This is a natural abstraction for many real-world processes that have
previously been modelled as purely static or temporal systems; for example, passenger transit
in public transport systems, neurotransmission in biological neural networks (e.g., Ref. [28]),
shipping in multimodal freight networks (e.g., Ref. [36]), movements in trade networks (e.g.,
Ref. [6]), and signal delay in telecommunications networks (such as the Internet). Our approach
mixes structure (i.e., topology), space, and time, and allows for an exploration of the influence of
each dimension on the processes occurring in these networks.
We summarise the relevant notation introduced throughout Sec. 2 to Sec. 3 in Table 1.
(a) Time-varying spatially embedded systems
A time-varying network is conventionally represented as a time-ordered sequence of graphs [31,
33,34,38,50], with each graph corresponding to a snapshot of the network during a particular time
window. The time intervals are commonly finite and equally sized, and we refer to the interval
duration as the temporal granularity τ . We assume an overall observation duration that consists of
T timesteps, starting with an initial time t1.
More formally, let V denote the set of all nodes in the system under study, and let N =
|V | be the number of nodes in the system. We consider a temporal graph consisting of T
discrete non-overlapping windows, represented by the time-ordered sequence of directed graphs
G[t1], . . . , G[tT ]. A particular graph G[t] = (V,E[t]) captures the topological state of the spatio-
temporal system during the interval [t, t+ τ). It is assumed that nodes are present throughout
the lifetime of the system; that is, each graph has the same node set V . For each graph G[t], where
t= t1, . . . , tT , there exists a counterpart weight matrix S[t] ∈RN×N that represents the weighted
directed edges between nodes during the interval [t, t+ τ). The weight of the edge from node v
to node w at time t corresponds to the element S[t]vw . In our model, S
[t]
vw is a non-negative scalar
representing the speed of physical propagation from v to w in the corresponding time interval.
For example, in a public transport system, v and w are typically transit stations and S[t]vw is the
average speed at which passengers are conveyed from v to w given the service operating during
[t, t+ τ). In the case that there is no connection from node v to w at time t, we have S[t]vw = 0.
4In a spatio-temporal system, the constituent entities naturally occupy a location in space,
and this location may vary over time. More formally, we assume nodes are embedded in a
k-dimensional metric space with physical distance function g. The embedding is dependent
on the system; for example, geographic networks are commonly represented in a spherical
(or ellipsoidal) coordinate system (where g is geodesic distance over the surface of the Earth)
or projected on to a two-dimensional Euclidian space. We write l[t]v to denote the physical
position1 of node v during the interval [t, t+ τ), noting that l[t]v ∈Rk. For convenience, we collect
the time-varying pairwise distances between nodes in a physical distance matrix D[t], where
D
[t]
vw = g(l
[t]
v , l
[t]
w ) for each v, w ∈ V . We make the simplifying assumption that multiple nodes
in the network cannot occupy the same location. In real-world systems, nodes represent physical
entities, and thus cannot occupy the same space.
(b) Model description
To apply classical network-theoretic concepts in a spatio-temporal system, we use the notion of
space-time constrained propagation between nodes. Paths through the spatio-temporal network
are defined by this process, which then form the basis for higher-order network measures such
as connected components and network distance. These paths obey the time-varying conditions of
the system along their route. This form of connectivity follows the same spreading process that is
common in defining temporal paths [31,34,50], with the modification that propagation from one
node to another is constrained by the speed of transmission between nodes and their physical
distance. This framework’s explicit encoding of time-varying speeds serves as an alternative to
event-based representations of similar networks (e.g., as applied to an air transport network in
Ref. [53]).
We consider propagation as a discrete-time process starting at an origin node v0 and the
initial time t1, and progressing over each subsequent timestep t2, t3, . . . , tT . In the following
description of the propagation process we treat the origin node v0 and start time t1 as implicit
parameters. Modelling non-instantaneous propagation in a time-varying system necessarily
involves capturing partial propagation between nodes, as well as the nodes that have been
reached along a path. The process is represented by two time-evolving structures: a reachability
set K[t] and an N -by-N progress matrix P[t]. The reachability set K[t] consists of nodes that have
been reached from origin node v0 by the end of timestep t. The progress matrixP[t] represents the
distance accumulated during direct propagation between nodes; more specifically, the element
P
[t]
vw gives the progress from node v to node w at timestep tmeasured as the distance accumulated
during propagation from v to w. A progress element represents the state of partial propagation
between the two nodes at the end of a timestep. In this process, progress from node v to w is
able to accumulate while the two nodes are continuously connected by an edge. The amount by
which progress is incremented in each timestep is governed by the propagation speed between
the two nodes. Given a sufficient period of continuous connectivity between v andw, progress can
accumulate to the point where it exceeds the physical distance between the two nodes, thereby
representing complete propagation from v to w.
To give an example, consider the case of a national rail network where the elements of the
network are cities and edges are transport links. Let us consider transportation with vehicles
travelling between two cities v andw at an average speed of 200 km/hour. If the distance between
the cities is 150 km, after a 15-minute time interval (indicated by τ = 15 minutes) the value P[t]vw
will be equal to 50 km. Thus, if the average speed remains constant, then three timesteps must
elapse before w is reachable from v.
Let us now consider the more-complex example in Fig. 1. Here we can see that source node
A reaches B and C in at most three subsequent timesteps. Specifically, full propagation from A to
B is able to occur in one timestep, arriving at timestep t2. Then, in the case of propagation from
1In practice, a non-stationary node may occupy many locations during this interval, and the method for choosing a single
representative location l[t]v depends on the system being studied.
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Figure 1. Example of the constrained propagation process in a spatio-temporal system.
Propagation begins with origin node A at timestep t1. Nodes are positioned at integer locations
on a Euclidian plane. Temporal granularity τ = 1 second. All edges have a propagation speed of
1m/s. Membership of a node in the reachability set K[t] at the end of timestep t is represented by
shading. The corresponding distance matrixD[t] and progress matrix P[t] are shown below each
network snapshot. Progress is also visually represented by shading along an edge. For clarity, we
omit fromD[t] distances between pairs of nodes that are not connected in G[t].
B to C, the distance between the nodes is larger, and thus more time is required to complete the
interaction. We therefore see that there is an intermediate stage in timestep t3 where there is only
partial propagation from B to C. This completes in timestep t4. The example also demonstrates
two failed propagation attempts between A and D. In t3 propagation is set to zero due to the
absence of an edge from A to D. The reappearance of the edge in timestep t4 allows propagation
to restart, but subsequently fails again at t6.
We now formalise the propagation process. The initial state of the process is such that origin
node v0 is the only reachable node and no progress has been made; that is, at the initial timestep
t1 we have K[t1] = {v0} and P[t1] is all zero. When progressing from timestep ti−1 to ti, where
i≥ 2, further propagation from a reachable node v to an unreachable nodew depends on whether
an edge from v to w exists in timestep ti. If these conditions hold, the distance by which we can
increment progress from v to w is the propagation increment τ · S[ti]vw , where S[ti]vw is propagation
speed and τ is the window duration. We note that the propagation increment may exceed the
remaining distance required to propagate from v to w, which we denote by q[ti]vw . The quantity
τ · S[ti]vw therefore represents the maximum amount that may be added to the progress of v to w,
while the actual increment is given by
min(τ · S[ti]vw , q[ti]vw ) . (2.1)
The remaining distance q[ti]vw is obtained from the current physical separation distance D
[ti]
vw and
previous progress P[ti−1]vw as
q
[ti]
vw =D
[ti]
vw −P[j−1]vw , (2.2)
or set to 0 if this quantity becomes negative due to a change in the pair’s positions between the
two timesteps.
Finally, we derive the progress matrix update rule. The value P[ti]vw in timestep ti, where i≥ 2,
is
P
[ti]
vw =P
[ti−1]
vw + min(τ · S[ti]vw , q[ti]vw ) (2.3)
6if v ∈K[ti−1], w 6∈K[ti−1], and edge (v, w) exists in G[ti]. In the other case that the system as no
edge from v to w at timestep ti, progress is reset and so P
[ti]
vw is set to 0. Propagation from v to w
is considered successful in timestep ti if the cumulative progressP
[ti]
vw between the nodes exceeds
or equals their physical distanceD[ti]vw . In such a case,w is regarded as reachable from source node
v0 at timestep ti, and w is included in the set K[ti]. More formally, the reachability set at timestep
ti is expressed as
K[ti] =K[ti−1] ∪ {w | ∃ v s.t.P[ti]vw ≥ D[ti]vw } . (2.4)
In the preceding equation, P[ti]vw ≥ D[ti]vw represents the case that sufficient time has elapsed
for propagation to complete, expressed in terms of the cumulative propagation distance P[ti]vw
with respect to the current separation D[ti]vw between the two nodes. Hence, the process models
the effect of nodes that may be non-stationary in their spatial embedding. This means that, for
example, propagation is accelerated when two nodes are moving towards one another.
To summarise, the spatio-temporal constrained propagation process is entirely described by
the time-evolution of three matrices: a physical distance matrixD[t] of spatial distances between
nodes; a propagation speed matrix S[t], which specifies the speed of transmission between
pairs of connected nodes; and a progress matrix P[t], which tracks incremental propagation
between nodes and evolves according to Equation 2.3. Node-to-node propagation is successful
only after sufficient time has elapsed, and this duration is a result of the timestep width τ , the
time-dependent distance between nodes, and the time-dependent speed between nodes.
As with discrete-time temporal network representations (e.g., [4,22,28,51,63]), the temporal
granularity τ represents a necessary trade-off between abstraction and fidelity. In our propagation
process, finer granularities minimise the amount of excess in the propagation increment on
successful propagation (i.e., P[ti]vw −D[ti]vw ). Too-coarse a granularity leads to under-estimation of
the true propagation duration, and over-estimation of the propagation distance. An upper bound
for the quality of the choice of the parameter τ can be obtained by considering the physical
distances and speeds of the underlying system. In particular, we find the minimum non-zero
value of the product D[t]vw · S[t]vw over all t= t1, . . . , tT and v, w ∈ V . For the given choice of
τ , this quantity represents the minimum direct propagation duration that exists in any of the
system’s snapshots. If the minimum direct propagation time is greater than τ , it means that the
representation is guaranteed to under-sample the temporal dynamics of the network.
We have so far considered propagation through the system from a single origin node v0,
starting at timestep t1, and proceeding through timesteps t= t2, t3, . . . , tT . For network analysis,
this allows us to construct spatio-temporal paths originating at v0. The main features from the
propagation process we consider are the time at which a node w was reached from v0, and the
physical distance travelled through intermediate propagation along the route from v0 to w. By
repeating this process from each node in V we construct system-wide network connectivity in
the time interval [t1, tT + τ), thereby yielding spatio-temporal paths starting at time t1.
(c) Spatio-temporal paths and distance measures
In general, a spatio-temporal path from node v0 may visit multiple distinct vertices before reaching
its destination node. A spatio-temporal path consisting of n≥ 0 hops, starting with origin node
v0 at timestep t1, is described as the sequence of n+ 1 pairs〈
(v0, t1), (v1, t
′
arr1), (v2, t
′
arr2), . . . , (vn, t
′
arrn)
〉
, (2.5)
where vj denotes the jth node visited on the path and t′arrj denotes the time at which the
path reached node vj . Spatio-temporal paths are readily constructed by tracing the propagation
process described in the previous section.
In addition to the timestep t′arrj in which the path arrives at a node vj , the propagation process
also captures the physical distance traversed in reaching vj from preceding node vj−1, given by
7the progress matrix element
P
[t′arrj ]
vj−1vj . (2.6)
This quantity is useful for studying the distance travelled along the route. We also note that any
such path constructed from the propagation process also obeys the temporal-ordering condition
t1 < t
′
arr1 < . . . < t
′
arrn . (2.7)
Furthermore, as is the case with temporal networks, reachability in spatio-temporal networks is
non-transitive and non-symmetric.
To illustrate an example, in Fig. 1 we can see that node A is able to reach nodes B, C, and
E. From this we can construct the spatio-temporal routes taken to reach each node from A. For
example, to reach E we can trace the path from A through nodes B and C and identify the total
time taken as five seconds and overall physical distance travelled along the path as four metres.
Throughout the rest of the paper our notation will omit the observation window [t1, tT + τ) in
which the spatio-temporal paths obtained from a spatio-temporal system, leaving it as an implicit
parameter. We stress, however, that the following measures we introduce are defined on the paths
present in such an interval.
Temporal paths are characterised by two notions of length [33,50]: the topological length, which
is the number of hops along the path2, and latency, which is the time elapsed from source to
destination. In reference to the previous description of a spatio-temporal path (Equation 2.5),
topological length corresponds to n and latency is given by t′arrn − t1. In the context of a spatio-
temporal path, an additional relevant feature is the spatial length of a path from v0 to vn, given
by
n∑
j=1
P
[t′arrj ]
vj−1vj . (2.8)
These quantities allow us to explore connectivity in the network from topological, temporal, and
spatial perspectives.
To study the robustness of the system we focus on the shortest paths between nodes, as these
represent optimal routes within the system. Indeed, the typical length of such paths is assumed
to be representative of the overall efficiency of the network. As commonly defined in temporal
networks [33,50], a path from node v to w is a temporally shortest path if it has minimum latency.
We extend this definition to our spatio-temporal setting. Formally, a path from v to w is a spatio-
temporally shortest path if it is a temporally shortest path and has minimum spatial length.
Although multiple temporally shortest paths may exist from one node to another, it is a subset
of these paths that are spatio-temporally shortest, and all such paths share the same latency and
spatial length. Under this definition, notions of spatio-temporal distance in the network have a
well-defined meaning. Specifically, the temporal distance distλvw from v to w is the latency of the
spatio-temporal shortest path from v to w. Similarly, the spatial distance distςvw from v to w is
the spatial length of the spatio-temporal shortest path from v to w. In the case that w cannot be
reached from v in the given time interval (and thus no path exists between them) both distance
quantities are set to∞.
In practice, to compute spatio-temporal shortest paths in a network, we follow an epidemic
(i.e., breadth-first) approach, similar to the Brandes method [12] for computing betweenness
centrality in weighted static networks. As with the Brandes algorithm, we must enumerate
shortest paths through the network; however, due to the non-transitive and non-symmetric nature
of temporal and spatio-temporal paths, intermediate shortest paths cannot be re-used in the
calculation of broader paths. Here we construct a breadth-first shortest path tree for each node
in the network. The tree is rooted at the given node, and spatio-temporal shortest paths from the
root are obtained according to the process defined in Sec. 2. (b). In our implementation, computing
each tree can require a worst-case time ofO(N2) whereN is the number of nodes. In our practical
2Specifically, topological length is the number of hops along the (temporally) shortest path, which may not necessarily be a
path with the minimum number of hops between the two nodes.
8experiments (see datasets in Sec. 4), we parallelise this tree-construction process, and find that it
is feasible to extract shortest paths in networks up to a size of 400-450 nodes, though note that
runtime also depends on the sparsity of the network.
3. Random error and systematic attack
In order to study the resilience of a network we define different ways in which nodes are selected
to fail.
Random error (abbreviated to Err) refers to probabilistic models of node failure. In this paper, we
consider uniform random failure, where each node has an equal independent failure probability
of f , yielding an expected number of node failures f ·N . Random error allows us to measure
the typical response of the network to random breakdowns. It is also a useful comparison for
systematic attack, as any intelligent attack strategy should be at least as harmful to the network
as random error.
Systematic attacks on networks rely on the ability to strategically identify and deactivate nodes
that are critical to the function of the system. Although many measures of node centrality are
available to define attack strategies [49], only a subset of these are effective in rapidly disrupting
the behaviour of a network [53,67]. Attack on spatio-temporal networks adds further complexity, as
the importance of a node can be evaluated in terms of its centrality in the topological, temporal,
and/or spatial structure of the system, properties which are not necessarily correlated.
In the rest of this section we introduce relevant centrality measures and formalise the attack
strategies we use to test the robustness of a spatio-temporal network. We also define the quantities
with which we measure the performance of a network.
(a) Spatio-temporal centrality measures
A variety of formulations of closeness in temporal networks have been developed. Given the
non-symmetry of connectivity and latency in temporal networks, we must distinguish between
in- and out-closeness. In particular, common definitions include temporal out-closeness [53] and
temporal in-farness [60,67]. The latter has been proposed as a basis for a centrality measure in
systematic attacks on networks [60,67]. Here we present temporal in-closeness as the reciprocal
of temporal in-farness. Formally, given the giant temporal in-component Cv of node v, we can
consider the average temporal distance of nodes that reach v as
`v =
1
|Cv| − 1
∑
w∈Cv;w 6=v
distλwv . (3.1)
A node with low `v is considered more-central in the network. An unreachable node has no utility
in the network, and thus we set `v =∞ if Cv is singleton. The temporal in-closeness of a node v is
then given by
CTCv =
1
`v
. (3.2)
Inverting in-farness simply reverses the ranking of nodes, ensuring high values for more-central
nodes.
However, while closeness is useful for identifying nodes capable of rapidly reaching the rest
of the network (e.g., for fast patching of computer malware [61]), it does not directly measure
the reliance of the network on a node as an efficient connector, which is often a critical source
of network fragility. This notion is better represented by betweenness centrality [32], which we
extend to our spatio-temporal network as follows. First, we denote the set of spatio-temporally
shortest paths from node w to node u by σwu and let σwu(v) denote the subset of paths in σwu
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Figure 2. Comparison of path betweenness and betweenness efficiency. Although both shaded
nodes have the same path betweenness, the bottom node has higher betweenness efficiency.
Deactivating the bottom node has a larger impact on the overall temporal performance of the
network.
that pass through node v. Path betweenness centrality is then defined for a node v as
CPBv =
∑
w,u∈V ;w 6=u
|σwu(v)|
|σwu| . (3.3)
Although this quantity represents the importance of a node in supporting connectedness within
the network, it does not necessarily reflect a node’s potential role as a hub through which
information can be quickly transferred. Indeed, efficient temporal conduits such as these are
especially important for rapid transmission within a network (as recently highlighted in Ref. [4]),
and deactivating these conduits can have significant impact on the global efficiency of the
network. We therefore define the betweenness efficiency centrality of a node v as
CBEv =
∑
(w,u)∈ βv
1
distλwu
, (3.4)
where βv is the set of source-destination pairs for each path in σwu(v). The reciprocal distance
1/distλwu is useful as a measure of the efficiency of the shortest path w to u, and is commonly
used in evaluating the network efficiency of static [42,43] and temporal [33,50,62] networks.
(b) Attack strategies
We summarise our five chosen attack strategies as follows. Temporal closeness attack (TC)
deactivates nodes in decreasing order by temporal in-closeness centrality. This follows the order
defined in the initial (intact) network, similar to the approach in Ref. [67].
Path betweenness attack (PB) and betweenness efficiency attack (BE) exploit path betweenness
centrality and betweenness efficiency centrality, respectively. As shown in Ref. [32], the geodesic
paths in a network can significantly change after each failure. Thus, in both betweenness-based
attacks, the centrality ranking is recalculated after each node failure.
Fig. 2 demonstrates the difference in how PB attack and BE attack prioritise their node
deactivations. Deactivating either shaded node will have a similar effect on the network’s spatio-
temporal connectivity; however, the bottom node is supporting paths that have faster propagation
flow. Betweenness efficiency attack prioritises nodes which are bottlenecks with high temporal
load.
Finally, we include two attacks based on the degree distribution of the intact network: in-
degree attack (ID) and out-degree attack (OD). Unlike the other three attack strategies, the ID
and OD strategies do not rely on global computation of the spatio-temporal paths in a system.
Specifically, we extract in-degrees and out-degrees from the unweighted static aggregate of the
original temporal network.
10(c) Vulnerability measures
Analysis of robustness depends on the indicators used to quantify network performance. Here we
introduce the measures we use to evaluate the topological, temporal, and spatial vulnerability of
a spatio-temporal network. While there are many properties relevant to the study of the function
of a network, we are careful to select measures that do not confound these three properties.
An important property of real-world networks is the size of the largest strongly connected
component, as this represents the extent to which the network is mutually reachable. This is
commonly used to study topology in static and temporal contexts [3,32,60]. The notion of a
connected component in a spatio-temporal network follows from the temporal definition in
Ref. [51]. Formally, a strongly connected component A is a set of nodes where there exists a
spatio-temporal path between all pairs of nodes v, w ∈A. The giant strong component size S is the
size of the largest strongly connected component as a fraction of the overall number of nodes N .
The definition of giant weak component size follows similarly. However, we focus our robustness
analysis on strong component size as this measure is especially relevant in many real-world
systems; for example, the resilience of the giant strong component represents the ability of a public
transport system to retain mutual navigability when subject to station closures. We note that in
this paper we deal with giant components in finite-size real-world systems.
Efficiency [42,43] gives us a method to explore the overall spatial and temporal performance
of a network. For a chosen distance measure (i.e., temporal λ or spatial ς), efficiency tells us
how effective a network is in supporting rapid transmission with minimum distance travelled.
Formally, temporal efficiency (first defined in Ref. [62]) is the average reciprocal latency over all
pairs of nodes in the network, expressed as
Eλ = 1
N(N − 1)
∑
v 6=w
1
distλvw
. (3.5)
This quantity is normalised between 0 and 1. In our spatio-temporal framework, Eλ = 1 is
achieved if direct propagation between all pairs of nodes occurs in one timestep. On the other
hand, Eλ = 0 if propagation does not succeed between any nodes, which can occur if there are
no transmission links, or propagations speeds are insufficient to complete direct propagation
between nodes.
Our examination of network vulnerability focuses on the system’s response to the failure of
one or more nodes, which has previously been measured in temporal networks using temporal
robustness [67]. In this paper we study the effect of complete deactivation of a node; i.e., where
the failed node no longer has any connections to or from the rest of the system. Consider a set of
deactivated nodesD⊆ V . We denote the temporal efficiency of a network with deactivated nodes
D by Eλ(D). The relative efficiency is then given by Eλ(D) / Eλ. When evaluating a systematic
attack, the choice of nodes D depends on the chosen attack strategy. An effective strategy is
one that can cause significant damage with few node deactivations, thus we are particularly
interested in the relative efficiency with respect to the fraction f of nodes deactivated, f = |D|/N .
Formally, we refer to this as the network’s temporal robustness Rλ(f) after the fraction f of nodes
have been deactivated. In probabilistic failure models, such as uniform random deactivation,
Rλ(f) represents the expected relative temporal efficiency given failure probability f . (In general,
measuring robustness through the relative decline in a global network quantity is sometimes
referred to as the R-value of that quantity [66].)
While temporal efficiency measures the latency of the network, its spatial counterpart, spatial
efficiency Eς , is calculated over the reciprocal spatial distances between nodes in the network.
Node failure will force paths to take alternative routes in the network, typically over longer
physical distances, therefore reducing spatial efficiency. We denote a network’s spatial robustness
with respect to a given deactivation rate f by Rς(f).
11Table 2. Summary of the six spatio-temporal systems explored in this paper: timetabled London
Underground transits (LONDON METRO), Paris Metro transits (PARIS METRO), New York
City Subway transits (NEW YORK METRO), US domestic flights (US FLIGHTS), the nervous
system of C. Elegans (C. ELEGANS), and mobile communications among university students
(STUDENTLIFE). For each network we show the number of nodes N , number of directed
edges |E∗| in the aggregate static graph, temporal granularity τ (also referred to as window
size), number of timesteps T , temporal duration, topological temporal correlation C (Ref. [63]),
topological reciprocity r¯, weight reciprocity ρ¯, average radius of gyration y¯gyr over all nodes, and
median propagation speed over all edges. See appendices for definitions of reciprocity (App. A)
and radius of gyration (App. B) in a spatio-temporal system.
Network N |E∗| τ T Duration C r¯ ρ¯ y¯gyr Med. speed
LONDON METRO 270 628 2 mins 1440 2 days 0.526 0.77 0.71 0.00 m 8.39 m/s
PARIS METRO 302 705 2 mins 1440 2 days 0.444 0.76 0.68 0.00 m 6.56 m/s
NEW YORK METRO 417 1058 2 mins 1440 2 days 0.347 0.50 0.48 0.00 m 7.09 m/s
US FLIGHTS 299 3947 30 mins 480 10 days 0.382 0.42 0.38 0.00 m 152.81 m/s
C. ELEGANS 279 2990 10ms 1200 12s 1.000 0.47 0.45 0.00 m 0.44 mm/s
STUDENTLIFE 22 68 60 mins 1008 42 days 0.007 0.78 0.78 18.9 km inst.
(d) Computation of attack strategies and measures
In terms of computation, temporal closeness (TC), path betweenness (PB), and betweenness
efficiency (BE) attacks all require calculation of spatio-temporal shortest paths in the underlying
network (see Section 2. (c) for more information). Similarly, measurement of efficiency depends
on the shortest distances between each pair of node in the network. Due to the non-transitive and
non-symmetric nature of spatio-temporal paths, in practice we must use the affine graph method
to compute giant component sizes (see Ref. [51] for details), which is the basis for the giant strong
component size vulnerability measure. The two local-knowledge attack strategies (ID and OD)
are simpler to compute, requiring only knowledge of the aggregate degree distribution.
4. Empirical spatio-temporal networks
In this paper we analyse the spatio-temporal robustness of transport, biological, and social
systems through six real-world networks. Here we detail how each network is constructed.
Specific choices of temporal granularity, number of snapshots, and observation duration for
each network can be found in Table 2. The table also includes descriptive summaries of each
network’s properties. Further detail on the data materials used in the preparation of each network
can be found in the Electronic Supplementary Material. This also includes visualisations of the
time-evolution of each network.
London Underground (LONDON METRO): The London Underground is a rapid transit
transport system that covers much of Greater London. In our spatio-temporal construction of
the Underground system, we model the transits of passenger trains moving between each station
along their timetabled routes. Each node is a metro station. We build a fine-grained time-varying
representation of station-to-station transit speeds from the vehicles’ scheduled journey times and
distances. In a given snapshot, we obtain the propagation speed between two consecutive stops
by averaging the speeds of trains serving those stations during the corresponding time interval.
We select the timetable of February 2015 and set the observation start time to Monday at 00:00.
ParisMetro (PARIS METRO): We obtain a spatio-temporal construction of the Paris Metro using
the same approach as for LONDON METRO, resulting in a network consisting of 302 stations. We
select the timetable of December 2015 and set the observation start time to Monday at 00:00.
New York Subway (NEW YORK METRO): Our spatio-temporal construction of the New
York City Subway also follows the same approach as LONDON METRO. We select the weekday
timetable of December 2015 and an observation start time of Monday 00:00. Multiple stations
12comprising the same station complex are unified into one node, yielding 417 subway stations
active in the observation period.
US Domestic Flights (US FLIGHTS): The flights network is constructed from actual take-off
and landing times of domestic passenger flights in the United States in the month of February
2014. Each node is a US airport. Our approach to extracting transit speeds is similar to LONDON
METRO. Time zones are normalised to EST, and we start our observation window at Monday
00:00. Airports are spatially embedded on the WGS-84 ellipsoid and physical distances are
calculated using Vincenty’s equation. We note that, unlike the LONDON METRO dataset, the flight
times are from reported data, rather than a priori timetables. Thus, the flight durations reflect
environmental conditions that may delay or hasten transits.
C. Elegans (C. ELEGANS): Caenorhabditis elegans (C. Elegans) is a nematode and the first
organism to have its entire cellular nervous system mapped [71], including its growth from
embryogenesis [52,68], spatial configuration [35], and wiring [15,69]. In our spatio-temporal
construction of the C. Elegans network, we study signalling among the neurons in the adult
worm. Neuron spatial coordinates were collected in Ref. [35] and are given in two-dimensions
along the worm’s lateral plane. Missing neuron coordinates were supplemented using the
approach described in Ref. [68]. The topological structure of the system is constructed using
the synaptic connection data compiled in Ref. [15] and Ref. [69]. The connectivity data includes
the type (chemical or electrical) and density of directed synaptic connections, allowing us to
infer transmission delay between neurons. The task of empirically measuring synaptic latency
in C. Elegans is particularly challenging and so far only a small number of synapses have been
examined. State-of-the-art optogenetic methods show that synaptic delay over chemical-only
synapses is on the order of milliseconds [45], and specifically in the range 10ms to 30ms (see
Sup. Fig. 1 in Ref. [45]). We encode propagation speeds in our network according to this range
of baseline measurements, scaling speed values based on the synapse type (chemical, electrical,
or both) and physical distance. Thus, we differentiate between these two type of connection (i.e.,
electrical and chemical).
Dartmouth StudentLife Experiment (STUDENTLIFE): The StudentLife experiment [70] used
continuous smartphone monitoring to follow a cohort of students at Dartmouth College
over one academic semester. To study the information sharing potential of this network
using our spatio-temporal framework we construct the patterns of communication between
students via their SMS and phone logs. Each node corresponds to a student participating
in the experiment. Communication events between phones correspond to opportunities for
instantaneous information transmission between students. Contact between two students in a
particular timestamp maps to a link with infinite propagation speed. In particular, calls are
represented as bidirectional edges and SMS messages are treated as directed from sender to
recipient. Students’ mobility patterns are extracted from their GPS and wireless access point
geolocation logs. Our observation window covers six weeks from Monday 8 April 2013.
Our framework offers an alternative approximation of passenger transit (i.e., in LONDON,
PARIS, NEW YORK, and US FLIGHTS) to other, space-agnostic temporal models. They capture the
speed at which passengers can be conveyed, as well as dependence on time-ordering. We note that
the aggregated directed versions of these two networks have over 99% reciprocity, whereas their
average reciprocity in the spatio-temporal representation is much lower (Table 2). This highlights
the loss of information caused by time aggregation. The effect is especially pronounced in US
FLIGHTS, where we see that simultaneous inbound and outbound flights between two airports
are rare. We also note the variation in temporal correlation over the datasets. C. ELEGANS is the
only network with a static topology, giving a correlation of 1.
Fig. 3 shows the growth of reachability in each spatio-temporal network as the temporal
horizon is extended. In the case of the two transport networks, we see the formation of spatio-
temporal paths during normal operating hours, contrasting with little or no growth during early
morning. NEW YORK is unlike the other two metro systems as it operates 24/7, with a slightly
reduced night service between midnight and 6am. We also note the effect of different temporal
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Figure 3. (Colour) Influence of temporal horizon on the giant (strong) component size S. The
temporal horizon h limits the observation window during which spatio-temporal paths are
extracted to [t1, t1 + h).
and spatial scales present in each network. The Underground reaches full coverage within a day,
whereas neural network communication is on the order of seconds. Although most of the US flight
network is mutually reachable within one day, a number of remote off-mainland airports with
limited service are responsible for delaying full coverage by up to a week. Due to the presence
of five isolated nodes in the reconstruction of the C. Elegans nervous system we observe that the
giant strong component in C. ELEGANS does not reach full coverage. This is also observed in
aggregate analyses of C. Elegans [69].
5. Results and discussion
In this section, we use the framework outlined in Sec. 2 to compare the response of real-world
spatio-temporal networks (described in Sec. 4) when subject to the node failure models presented
in Sec. 3. Before considering systematic attack strategies, we first explore the response of each
network to random error.
(a) Tolerance to random error
Fig. 4 shows the response of each robustness measure with respect to uniform random failure.
We used 1,000 random realisations at each deactivation rate to obtain expected values for each
quantity. The LONDON network is substantially less robust according to all three measures. In
Fig. 4a we see that the network becomes highly fragmented after very few failures, and the giant
component is effectively eliminated (filling less than 5% of the network) at failure rates above 0.6.
In an ideal configuration, deactivating one node should have minimum effect in disconnecting
other nodes in the network. We see that US FLIGHTS and C. ELEGANS are much closer to this
resilient behaviour. When comparing the edge density of the directed aggregate networks (0.9%
for LONDON, 0.7% for PARIS, 0.6% for NEW YORK, 4.4% for US FLIGHTS, 3.9% for C. ELEGANS,
and 14.7% for STUDENTLIFE) this may in part be explained by more path redundancy in the
high-density networks. Although the giant component size in the intact STUDENTLIFE network
is smaller, the profile of its relative decay is similar to that of US FLIGHTS and C. ELEGANS. We
also observe that C. ELEGANS is typically more resilient than US FLIGHTS, despite C. ELEGANS
having slightly lower density. C. ELEGANS also exhibits increasing giant-component vulnerability
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(c) Spatial robustness
Figure 4. (Colour) Vulnerability to random node failure measured by giant strongly connected
component size S, temporal robustness Rλ, spatial robustness Rς . Expected values for quantities
were obtained through simulation of 1,000 random realisations at each deactivation rate, and are
represented by solid curves. Standard error (shaded region surrounding each curve) is negligible.
in the f = 0.5 to 0.8 range, eventually becoming more fragmented than US FLIGHTS. Its temporal
and spatial robustness (Fig. 4b and Fig. 4c), on the other hand, do not exhibit the same behaviour.
Comparing Fig. 4b and Fig. 4c, we note that the spatial robustness of US FLIGHTS, C. ELEGANS,
LONDON, and PARIS follow a degradation pattern similar to their temporal robustness. In these
systems, spatio-temporal paths are constrained by finite node-to-node propagation speeds. The
propagation speeds in these networks are also heterogeneous, with the amount of diversity
depending on the particular system; for example, longer track segments in LONDON and longer
flight paths in US FLIGHTS tend to have higher average speeds (flight duration also depends on
atmospheric conditions), and synaptic transmission speeds in C. Elegans depend on the signalling
mechanism. On the other hand, the homogeneous infinite propagation speeds in STUDENTLIFE
permit transmission to occur instantaneously, independent of the physical separation between
individuals, and thus we see very different behaviour in this network with respect to spatial and
temporal robustness (Fig. 4b and Fig. 4c).
(b) Static spatial paths vs. spatio-temporal paths
Of the three urban transit systems, we note that NEW YORK exhibits the greatest difference in
response to random failure between spatial and temporal robustness (Fig. 4b versus Fig. 4c; area
under curve comparison in Table 3). In Fig 5, we demonstrate the differing routes taken according
to spatio-temporal paths versus shortest paths in the equivalent aggregate spatial network. We
find that spatio-temporal distances tend to take longer routes through the network than purely
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Figure 5. (Colour) Three urban transport networks and the US flights network. Comparison of
spatio-temporal paths to shortest spatial paths in the aggregate spatial network, measured by
spatial distance. Shortest spatial paths follow minimum spatial length. Each heatmap compares
the spatial distances between pairs of stations according to definitions of spatial path and spatio-
temporal path. Pearson correlation between these distances is 0.983, 0.952, 0.871, and 0.950 for
LONDON, PARIS, NEW YORK, and US FLIGHTS, respectively.
spatial paths in NEW YORK. Indeed, correlation between these pairwise distances is least in the
NEW YORK network; that is, minimum-latency routes tend to traverse longer distances in the
NEW YORK transit system. We note that the comparison in this figure is in the intact networks (i.e.,
without node deactivations), to highlight the differences in the types of paths in these systems.
(c) Tolerance to systematic attack
To study attack tolerance we apply the deactivation strategies defined in Sec. 3 to each network,
allowing us to measure network performance after a fraction of nodes f are deactivated.
Although all attack schemes are generally more effective than random error, there is substantial
variation in their performance. In Fig. 6 we plot the effectiveness of each strategy at dismantling
the giant component. In US FLIGHTS, the damage caused by the four non-closeness attacks is
very similar. We see some slight variation in giant-component vulnerability with respect to each
attack (Fig. 6d), and very similar behaviour in temporal vulnerability (Fig. 7d). This contrasts with
LONDON and C. ELEGANS, where the betweenness-based attacks follow substantially different
profiles to the degree-based attacks.
The two betweenness attacks are very effective at dismantling the giant component in
LONDON up to f = 0.05 (Fig. 6a). At this point (i.e., with 5% of the nodes deactivated), the nodes
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Figure 6. (Colour) Robustness of the giant strongly connected component when each system
is subject to five systematic attack strategies: temporal closeness (TC), path betweenness (PB),
betweenness efficiency (BE), in-degree (ID), and out-degree (OD). Vulnerability to random failure
(Err) included for comparison. Shaded regions represent standard deviation (see Fig. 4 for
standard error).
vital to connecting London’s central core to peripheral Underground lines have been deactivated.
A substantial proportion of nodes (roughly 190 of 270 stations) belong to isolated clusters in this
now-disconnected outer region. There is more tolerance to failure in the remaining core, as we
observe from the gradual decline in S from f = 0.05, and the giant component is finally eliminated
at f = 0.45. Interestingly, the threshold at which systematic attack eliminates the giant component
in US FLIGHTS (see Fig. 6d) is much lower; specifically, this occurs at f = 0.16 for US FLIGHTS
and at f = 0.45 for LONDON.
Comparing Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, we observe how the two betweenness centralities attack
reachability and temporal efficiency differently. Path betweenness (PB) preferentially attacks
nodes through which many geodesic paths flow, whereas betweenness efficiency (BE) prioritises
nodes supporting temporally efficient paths. Thus, the giant component is harmed more rapidly
in the PB attack (Fig. 6), and temporal robustness declines more quickly under the BE attack
(Fig. 7). This difference is especially pronounced in C. ELEGANS (Fig. 6e and Fig. 7e).
To judge the overall effectiveness of a particular attack for a given performance measure,
we also consider the area under each robustness curve. Values for random failure and the
two betweenness-based attacks are provided in Table 3. We see that these two attacks indeed
preferentially degrade different features of a network. Specifically, Table 3 highlights that for
LONDON, C. ELEGANS, and STUDENTLIFE, the lowest overall S-robustness is achieved with the
PB attack strategy and the lowest overall Rλ-robustness is achieved with the BE attack strategy.
We also find that in the other three networks (US FLIGHTS, NEW YORK, and PARIS), the effect is
much less pronounced, where both PB and BE have roughly the same effect with respect to the
two vulnerability measures (S and Rλ).
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Figure 7. (Colour) Robustness of temporal efficiency under systematic attack. Labels and colours
same as Fig. 6. Shaded regions represent standard deviation (see Fig. 4 for standard error).
Table 3. Overall effectiveness of path betweenness attack (PB) and betweenness efficiency attack
(BE) measured by the area under each robustness curve. Areas are provided for two vulnerability
measures: giant strong temporal component size (S) and temporal robustness (Rλ). A lower value
indicates an attack that is more aggressive. Random failure (Err) is also included for comparison.
Area Under Robustness Curve
S Rλ
Err PB BE Err PB BE
LONDON METRO .195 .035 .039 .134 .042 .034
PARIS METRO .224 .043 .043 .136 .030 .030
NEW YORK METRO .221 .031 .031 .110 .024 .022
US FLIGHTS .431 .060 .060 .274 .025 .025
C. ELEGANS .448 .201 .234 .278 .124 .106
STUDENTLIFE .244 .132 .152 .287 .202 .190
In general, we observe that both betweenness-based attacks harm each network more
effectively than the degree-based strategies. This is intuitive, as betweenness-based attacks are
able to leverage global network information to decide their targets. What is more surprising
is that temporal closeness, which is also a global-knowledge attack, is ineffective at identifying
vulnerabilities in the network, and is often unable to out-perform the naïve degree-based attacks.
The same is true for the strategy’s effectiveness in attacking the network’s temporal efficiency
(Fig. 7). Temporal (in-)closeness specifically identifies ‘sink’ nodes that are effective endpoints for
information flow. These results show that such sinks do not tend to be important centres on which
18other nodes rely, and therefore their deactivation has relatively little impact on the performance
of the network.
We see that C. ELEGANS is substantially more robust to systematic attack. Using the most-
effective strategy in each network as a comparison, we see the giant component in C. ELEGANS is
highly resilient (Fig. 6e), managing to remain at over 80% coverage up to f = 0.12, whereas other
networks begin rapid degradation at f = 0.01 or lower.
Finally, we compare the responses of the four transport networks to the most-aggressive
attack strategies. We see that temporal and giant component degradation for LONDON (Fig. 7a
and Fig. 6a, respectively) both follow very similar patterns, indicating that mutual reachability
declines at a similar rate to the relative decline in temporal efficiency. This contrasts with US
FLIGHTS, whose giant component (Fig. 6d) is more resilient than its temporal robustness (Fig. 7d).
This differing behaviour shows that there is a period during systematic attack on US FLIGHTS
where the network suffers increasing temporal delay while its giant component remains almost
intact.
(d) Attack strategy correlations
To explore the attack strategies further, we compare the order with which each strategy
preferentially deactivates nodes (Fig. 8). Unsurprisingly, examples where we see the biggest
difference in attack performance are also where we see lowest correlation in deactivation order.
For example, in PARIS METRO and US FLIGHTS we see high correlation among most pairs of
strategies, and also observe that these strategies have similar robustness profiles, especially in
the case of US FLIGHTS. Comparing centrality correlation between the two betweenness attacks
(BE and PB) also offers insight. These are overall highly correlated in all networks. Specifically, we
observe correlation coefficients 0.732 for LONDON METRO, 0.788 for PARIS METRO, 0.613 for NEW
YORK METRO, 0.961 for US FLIGHTS, and 0.613 for C. ELEGANS (not plotted). However, where
we see less agreement between these two strategies, we also see the greatest differences in their
effectiveness at attacking the giant component (Fig. 6) versus temporal robustness (Fig. 7). This
effect is most pronounced in C. ELEGANS and NEW YORK METRO, which also have the lowest
PB-BE correlation of the networks we studied.
(e) Comparison with temporal centrality
Finally, we compare the two attack strategies based on spatio-temporal paths (PB and BE) to a
purely temporal counterpart. Here we explore whether a centrality measure based on temporally
shortest paths has the same effect as PB and BE. Specifically, we apply the temporal betweenness
centrality introduced in [50], which for convenience we refer to as PTPB (pure temporal path
betweenness). In the calculation of temporal betweeneess centrality, a node’s betweenness is
counted as the number of shortest temporal paths through it, as opposed to the number of shortest
spatio-temporal paths. In other words, these temporal paths are not constrained by distance and
propagation speed. (Equivalently, we can regard this as the case where all propagation speeds are
infinite.) We show the performance of these attacks for two metro systems, LONDON METRO and
NEW YORK METRO, in Fig 9. We see that the space-agnostic attack is less effective than PB and
BE in both systems.
6. Conclusions
The ability to explicitly represent non-instantaneous propagation that reflects the space and
time in which a network is embedded allows us to better understand the properties of real-
world spatio-temporal systems. In this paper, we develop a framework that combines these two
dimensions, constructing networks whose connectivity is constrained by the dynamics of the real-
world systems they represent. With this framework we explore the resilience of these systems
in terms of their topological, spatial, and temporal behaviour. The proposed approach is based
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Figure 8. (Colour) Three urban transport networks and the US flights network. Comparison of
the node deactivation order according to each strategy in each network. Correlation is measured
by the Kendall rank correlation coefficient (Kendall’s tau). Attack strategies as follows: path
betweenness (PB), temporal closeness (TC), in degree (ID), out degree (OD), and betweenness
efficiency (BE).
on a constrained-propagation model over a time-varying representation of interaction speeds
between nodes, and is a re-formulation of previous discrete-time instantaneous-spreading models
of temporal networks. Through numerical experiments on empirical systems we study the spatial,
temporal, and topological performance of spatio-temporal networks when subject to random
error and systematic attack. Our approach is particularly motivated by the joint spatial and
temporal nature of urban transport systems, while we additionally also test the generality of the
approach on other classes of network. We introduce global- and local-knowledge attack strategies,
finding that attacks based on the betweenness of nodes perform better than other strategies. Most
saliently, we find that the spatial, temporal, and topological responses of a system to node failure
can behave differently to the same attack strategy. In particular, we find that systematic attack
based on betweenness centrality is typically most effective at harming the temporal efficiency of
a network, leading to increased delays, whereas path betweenness is most effective at eliminating
mutual reachability within a network.
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Figure 9. (Colour) Comparison of spatio-temporal attacks (PB and BE) and the pure-temporal path
betweenness attack (PTPB).
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Appendices
A. Average reciprocity in a time-varying network
The reciprocity of a (single) directed graph characterises the overall extent to which each edge
in the network is in some way balanced by an edge in the opposite direction. This measure is
commonly defined for binary graphs [26], and has more recently been adapted to study weighted
graphs [58]. Here we describe how we extend this measure to characterise the average reciprocity
in a time-varying weighted directed network represented by the sequence of weight matrices
S[t1], S[t2], . . . , S[tT ] . (A 1)
First, let us consider a single weight matrix S[t] and obtain the global weighted reciprocity ρ[t]
of this (static) graph as defined by Squartini et al [58]. That is, given the total weight of the graph
W [t] =
∑
v
∑
w 6=v
S
[t]
vw (A 2)
and the total reciprocated weight of the graph
W
[t]↔ =
∑
v
∑
w 6=v
min(S
[t]
vw, S
[t]
wv) , (A 3)
we obtain the global weighted reciprocity as
ρ[t] =
W
[t]↔
W [t]
. (A 4)
In the case that the graph is empty, we set ρ[t] = 1. Finally, as a diagnostic of the reciprocity in the
whole time-varying network, we define the weight reciprocity as the average weighted reciprocity
ρ¯=
1
T
T∑
i=1
ρ[ti] . (A 5)
Weight reciprocity is normalised between 0 and 1. ρ¯= 1 indicates that each edge in the network
is reciprocated by an identically weighted edge in the opposite direction, and thus the network
is effectively undirected. In the opposite case, where each edge in the network has no reciprocal
counterpart, we have ρ¯= 0. We note that for the trivial case of an empty (edgeless) time-varying
network we have ρ¯= 1.
It is sometimes useful to ignore weights in the time-varying network and study reciprocity
from a purely topological viewpoint. We refer to this as the (average) topological reciprocity,
denoted by r¯. This quantity is the average reciprocity over the network’s sequence of binary
adjacency matrices.
B. Radius of gyration
To characterise the typical physical distance travelled by a node in a spatio-temporal system
we use the average radius of gyration taken over all nodes in the system. We follow the same
approach as previous work that has adapted the classical mechanical definition of radius of
gyration to discrete-time trajectories of moving objects [27].
Recall that in our representation of a spatio-temporal system, nodes are embedded in a k-
dimensional metric space with physical distance function g. Given a node v and its trajectory
22represented by the time-varying sequence of positions l
[1]
v , l
[2]
v , . . . , l
[T ]
v the radius of gyration of
v is expressed as
yvgyr =
(
1
T
T∑
i=1
g(l
[i]
v , y
v
µ)
2
)1/2
(A 1)
where yvµ is the centroid of the trajectory of v. Our summary of the mobility of the set of all nodes
V in a system is then given by the average radius of gyration
y¯gyr =
1
|V |
∑
v∈V
yvgyr . (A 2)
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